Part II of the Iran Series
FOREIGN PERSPECTIVE // March 2026 // Simon
Khamenei is dead. The Supreme Leader of Iran was killed in a precision strike at the very outset of the war. The classic calculus of American warfare – neutralizing the enemy through decapitation strikes – does not appear to be working. Unlike Venezuela, the system continues to function.
That is the real news. A new Supreme Leader was appointed within days. Decision-making chains remained intact. Retaliatory strikes systematically expanded the war to the Gulf states. The Strait of Hormuz is currently blocked. Those who believed that Khamenei’s death would break the regime fundamentally misunderstood the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
What does this mean? To understand it, we need a different lens on power.
The Apparatus of Power
A tool from Foucault’s analysis of power helps us here. The dispositif or apparatus. It describes the network of institutions, laws, practices, and discourses that organizes power.
„The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements.“
Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 1980
Applied to Iran, this theory means power does not reside in a person. It resides in a network. Khamenei was not the source of power; he was a central node within it. His death shook the network. It was not destroyed.
The Façade
Let us look at how this network concretely operates in Iran. The Iranian constitution stipulates that Article 111 comes into force upon the death of the Supreme Leader. That is precisely what happened. A provisional leadership council assumed control. A council of clerics convened and elected a legitimate successor. Everything proceeded in an orderly, legal fashion.
But another actor in the Iranian state, not the constitutional order, drove this process. After the Twelve-Day War in the summer of 2025, something had already shifted. Power within the Iranian state was distributed more broadly. Provincial governors received expanded authority. Military structures were widened. The position of the supreme leader was thereby relieved of some of its burden.
The constitution was not the mechanism of power. It is its façade. The real power had long been distributed—and had an entirely different center.
The IRGC as the True Sovereign
That center has a name: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, known as the IRGC.
Mojtaba Khamenei did not become Supreme Leader because he inherited his father’s religious authority. He was installed by the IRGC. He first emerged in 2009, during the brutal crackdown on the Green Movement, as a close associate of the Revolutionary Guards. He has remained their loyal supporter ever since.
The reason is straightforward. The Revolutionary Guards do not need a strong cleric. It is in their interest to have a manageable candidate as the official head of state. Mojtaba Khamenei is someone who knows the system and does not challenge it. The logic follows: the weaker the religious authority of the Supreme Leader, the more dependent he is on the apparatus, and consequently, the more powerful the apparatus becomes.
The historian Stephen Kotkin has shown that authoritarian systems systematically expand their repressive apparatus not only against external enemies but also against internal rivals and to secure their position. Iran serves as a prime example. The Revolutionary Guards are no longer an instrument of the Supreme Leader. They are his kingmaker.
The façade of a religious state remains. But the actual power has shifted.
The War as Catalyst
The war has made the power structures of Iran more visible.
The war posed a challenge to the Iranian system, one that the Revolutionary Guards turned to their advantage. Following the Twelve-Day War, the regime had systematically prepared. Decision-making structures were decentralized. Lower command units were granted independent authority to act. The logic was clear: even if the leadership falls, the system continues.
And that is precisely what happened.
The war has made the Revolutionary Guards indispensable. The Supreme Leader does not coordinate the retaliatory strikes, direct the militias, or block the Strait of Hormuz. That is the IRGC. In this existential threat to the Iranian regime, it becomes clear who truly holds the levers of power.
But what are the consequences for Iran, its civilian population, and its neighbors?
Outlook
What remains is a system that has survived but emerges from the war significantly weakened.
Infrastructure has been damaged. The economy is under enormous pressure. The nuclear program has been set back. Mojtaba Khamenei assumes an office that has been militarily hollowed out.
Weeks before Khamenei’s death, the IRGC had already demonstrated what it is capable of. During the protests in January 2026, the IRGC corps killed roughly 36,500 people. More than in any other episode of repression since the founding of the Islamic Republic.
The Revolutionary Guards still possess militias, drones, and asymmetric capabilities to conduct strikes against any enemy of Iran. A bitter and weakened regime remains a destabilizing force in the region.
For Iran’s civilian population and its diaspora, this is a bitter realization. The hope for change has not been fulfilled. Those who took to the streets in January 2026 and were violently suppressed now bear the additional burden of a war, without any improvement in their situation.
Sources
Primärquelle
- Michel Foucault: Dispositive der Macht, Merve Verlag, Berlin 1978 (deutsche Version)
- Michel Foucault: Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977, hrsg. von Colin Gordon, Pantheon Books, New York 1980 (englische Version)
Sekundärquellen Dispositv
- Jürgen Link: Dispositiv, in: Kammler/Parr/Schneider (Hg.): Foucault-Handbuch, 2007
Analysen und Expertenmeinungen
- Stephen Kotkin: The Weakness of the Strongmen, Foreign Affairs, Januar/Februar 2026
- Azadeh Zamirirad / Marco Overhaus / Peter Lintl: SWP-Podcast, März 2026
- Nate Swanson / Richard Haass: The Foreign Affairs Interview, Foreign Affairs, 5. März 2026
- Afshon Ostovar / Sanam Vakil: Iran’s Tenacious Regime and the Future of the Gulf, Foreign Affairs, 12. März 2026
Methodischer Hinweis: Diese Analyse stützt sich ausschließlich auf Publikationen der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) und Foreign Affairs. Die Perspektive ist transatlantisch geprägt.
Nicht-westliche Positionen werden in dieser Auswahl nicht berücksichtigt.
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